Model C recommends that PR Mps are returned from a rank based party list that is published before polling while Model A is in favour of choosing all 30 PR representatives from unsuccessful candidates in constituencies. Party list is the undisputed norm in all countries with mixed systems. All of them use rank ordered party list and I do not know any country with a mixed system that returns PR Mps from constituency good losers based on votes polled.

The reasons are plain in the literature and are well rehearsed by Sachs:

?The list can be composed in such a way as to present the best face of the party, it can cut across divides of race, religion, region and ethnicity?; ?it will help establish an appropriately balanced and representative ?rainbow? character for the party slate that ends up in Parliament? and ?it encourages parties to reach out to various communities and to seek wide national support?.

Further ?it would enable leading party figures defeated in constituencies to enter Parliament, facilitate the entry into Parliament of individuals with needed qualities, secure greater participation of women in Parliament and government, open the way for persons from disadvantaged groups, such as the disabled, to make their contribution?.

Party lists also avoid intra party infighting during elections, especially shenanigans based on communities, ethnicity, race and religion. The argument that candidates on Party list are not elected is weak. On the contrary they may have more legitimacy than good losers as they come in as winners based on their parties? national vote. The list should be published before the polls so that voters know who the candidates are. In effect they are elected nationally instead of being losers from constituencies. With two votes, people have the choice not to vote for the list if they are not happy with its composition and its ranking.

The criticism that party leaders would have too much power in determining the PR list is at best tenuous and at worst an utter denial of our political realities. Most people vote for parties and their leaders. Often elections become prime ministerial contests. Since the introduction of the current electoral system, there has never been an elected independent MP. If party leaders do not want a particular individual to stand as candidate, he-she has no chance of being elected.

The idea of returning PR Mps as good losers (including vote three and elect four) from constituencies has some support, particularly among some members of political parties who fear their heavyweight colleagues will take the electable positions on the list. While the concept appears fair, it is fraught with difficulties and will poison our system, the more so in a plural society. This is why it does not exist anywhere.

It would lead to intra party bickering as the three ?losing? running mates compete ferociously to qualify for a good loser seat. To ensure a broad based rainbow representation, it is much better to have a predetermined list than to gamble on the randomness of the good loser system. This should be so clear to anybody who knows how candidates are fielded and how the voting pattern could bias the choice of good losers.

Candidates from the same party will use communal, casteist and other below the belt arguments against their own colleagues. This is patently against party interests.

A good loser system will cause great prejudice to candidates who contest elections in very large constituencies. Mauritius has a major problem of malapportionment. There is huge variation in the number of electors among constituencies, leading to very high under-representation of some. In 1995, Beeharry won a seat with only 4405 votes while Soodhun did not get one with 7416 votes (68 % more). In 2000, Leopold, with only 7732 votes, won a seat while Petit, with 14626 (97 % more), did not.

Double candidacy

Model C prescribes double candidacies only for the leader of a party or an alliance. If parties go separately, it will apply to the leader of each party while if it is a party alliance, it will concern only its leader as per section 2 (1) of the first schedule of the Constitution. The leader can stand as a constituency candidate and be on the Party List at the same time. Model A recommends that all constituency contestants effectively have double candidacies as they can be retrieved as good losers.

It is amazing how Model C gets it right when it follows strictly what electoral experts propose; however it goes wrong when it tries to deviate from their recommendations. All countries that have mixed system allow parties to choose the number of double candidacies. The arguments for this are very strong and it does not make any difference whether there is single or three member constituencies. There is no reason why the freedom of parties should be constrained when they articulate their electoral strategies. One cannot dictate to them how they should field candidates. This is best left to party leaders.

We should avoid making elections an exercise in mathematical probability at the last minute, thus creating huge tension within parties as to who would be on the list and who would fight constituency contests. There will be a bitter feud for safe seats and for high ranks on the PR list. Strong and high ranking party officials would avoid marginal seats and this would work against party interest.

The non provision of double candidacies would deter the strong candidate from taking the risk and this would work against party interest. This is why double candidacies exist in countries with mixed system.

Some have argued that it is not proper to have two categories of candidates in the same constituency, as one could be on the Party List and not the other two. This is weak in comparison to the advantages that parties have in deciding freely on their electoral strategies. Already around 40 % of candidates have a second chance through the best loser system.

Does gender matter ?

This will be the hardest nut to crack.

Model C proposes that Party Lists be constituted with six women in the first 12 candidates while Model A does not make any provision for such presence.

It does not help at all to agree that women should gain political representation and to turn down quotas. There is unfortunately no other solution than quota to enhance women presence in Parliament. Voluntary solution has plainly failed as vested interests are too powerful. Only countries with quotas and PR system do well in terms of gender fairness. Other fare poorly.

The argument of culture, history and societal values is disdainful. It does not also stand the test of empirical evidence. Even in countries with a history and culture of discrimination against women, significant progress has been made in gender fairness through quotas.

It is not clear whether mandatory quotas and affirmative measures imposed by constitutional and legislative changes are the way forward as they can be construed as discriminatory. They can also be contested in Courts. The trend is to encourage parties to change their constitution and internal rules to allow greater gender participation at elections. And the critical mass is around 30 % of the legislature as recommended by the UN and SADC.

Model C proposes to allocate BLS after the appointment of 30 PR seats while Model A suggests that BLS be allotted before the PR seats. If we want to respect the philosophy and practice of the BLS, one cannot apportion these seats before the PR ones.

If Best Loser seats are distributed after the return of 62 FPTP Mps but before the election of 30 PR seats, there is a grave danger of huge under-representation not being corrected. A community which is under-represented after 62 FPTP seats may not remain so after the allotment of the 30 PR seats. It all depends on the communal composition of the 30 PR Mps.