AS the new year unfolds, the country is expected to witness major changes in the socio-political landscape while several epoch-making legislations are likely to keep our Parliamentarians on their toes. Besides the ?Muslim Personal Law?, the reintroduction of which will receive his undivided attention early into the year and the healing process of the Tengur-cum-Privy-Council-inflicted wounds to the Catholic Schools, which he promises to initiate as soon as the written judgment of the Law Lords is made available, Prime Minister Paul Berenger will, this year have to grapple with the no less important and sensitive issues of Electoral Reform and the Funding of Political Parties. Both issues are presently the subject of protracted discussions and serious consideration by two Parliamentary Select Committees, the first one presided by Hon.Yvan Collendavelloo and the second one by the Honourable Attorney General.

Constitutional and Electoral Reform Commission

It would perhaps not be an altogether futile exercise here, to go back to early December 2001, if only to refresh the reader's memory, when Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of South Africa was appointed Chairman of the Constitutional and Electoral Reform Commission with, as assessors, Mr B.B. Tandon, Electoral Commissioner of India and Mr Robert Ahnee, former member of the Mauritius Supreme Court.

At the beginning of its assignment, the Commission met successively with a number of State dignitaries, political figures and experts from both the ruling alliance and the Opposition, followed by hearings of those ?from organised political parties and cultural groups or concerned individuals?, who had expressed the wish to depone in front of it. Moreover, and to the Commissioners? credit, a series of illuminating talks, which gave rise to lively discussions, were held both in Mauritius and in Rodrigues.

The terms of reference of the Commission included the review of the Electoral Supervisory Commission and the Judicial and Legal Service Commission as well as the practical aspects relating to the holding of elections. It was also required to make proposals for constitutional amendments to give additional powers to the President of the Republic. Finally, it was to prepare a draft ?Public Funding of Political parties Bill? and to propose amendments to the Constitution for representation in Parliament on a proportional basis, within the existing electoral system.

Although the ruling alliance has a three-quarter majority in the National Assembly, it did not exercise the powers conferred by such a majority to unilaterally amend the Constitution and impose its views regarding reforms of the electoral system on the population. Instead, it chose to set up a Commission to thoroughly analyse the issues involved and to submit its considered recommendations after wide consultation with all parties concerned. Short of a referendum, it is the duty of the public to participate ? even at this late hour ? in what has been defined as an ?exercise of constitutional self-examination?.

I am limiting the scope of this paper to a discussion of the widely-accepted need for reform to our electoral system, which, over the past two decades, has, at every general election, invariably produced gross under-representation of the Opposition in Parliament, resulting in what I would term a perversion of democracy. I shall also discuss later, in another paper, the proposed legislation which provides for the funding of political parties. It is today an accepted fact that money used for the funding of political parties constitutes one of the most serious problems facing democratic governments. If our objective is to have fair and free elections ? fairer and freer elections ? would be a more appropriate expression for our country ? we cannot escape the debate around political financing or ?political money?.

The unprecedented 60-0 election result of 1982-fame was all but an exception, for a similar absolute result repeated itself in the 1995 General Elections and nearly so, in 1990 and 2000 when most of the parliamentary seats were clean swept, to the detriment of the opposition parties. In all these instances, nearly 40% of the population was either excluded from Parliament or seriously under-represented. A recurrent feature of those elections has been the creation of pre-election alliances as opposed to post-election coalitions which are more common in other democracies. It would be a matter of concern to all democracy lovers if we were to perpetuate an electoral system which produces such lopsided results and in which a political party supported by less than three-quarters of the electorate ? possibly less than half the votes ? can easily and with impunity bring about major changes to our sacrosanct Constitution.

First past the post or block votes

Our electoral system is commonly defined as the First Past the Post (FPTP).This is a technically erroneous definition. The FPTP is a form of plurality-majority system which uses single-member constituencies. The winning candidate is the one who gains more votes than any other candidate, but not necessarily a majority of votes. A more appropriate or more accurate definition of our electoral system would be the Block Vote system (BV), which is used in multi-member constituencies and where electors have as many votes as there are candidates to be elected ? three, in the case of Mauritius. Voting can be either candidate-centred or party-centred.The counting of votes is identical to the FPTP system, with the candidates bagging the highest vote totals winning the seats.

The BV has most of the advantages and disadvantages of the pure FPTP system, which is particularly recommended for being simple to use and understand, especially in societies with a high degree of illiteracy. A valid ballot requires only one mark or cross ? three in the case of Mauritius ? beside the name or symbol of the candidates. Authoritative text books and handbooks on Electoral designs allude to several advantages of the FPTP and FPTP-BV systems, which seem to be at variance with the Mauritian experience. Let us take a few examples to illustrate this interesting point.

One of the advantages of the FPTP system, it is argued, is that it gives rise to single party governments. Because of the ?seat bonuses?, where one party wins, for example, 45 % of the votes and 55 % of the seats, coalition governments are the exception rather than the rule.This situation is considered favourable since it provides cabinets unshackled from the retraints of having to bargain with a coalition partner.

The Mauritian experience, with its pre-election alliances being converted into a permanent feature of our parliamentary elections, reveals that we have beaten the system: here, FPTP favours coalition instead of party government, with all the compromises and accommodations it entails.

Another oft-quoted advantage of the FPTP system is that it provides for a coherent parliamentary opposition, which can and does present itself as a realistic alternative to the government of the day. Again in practice, it has been amply demonstrated here, for over two decades now, that the system gives rise to a maimed Opposition, outnumbered and often ineffective in Parliament, constantly on the look out for an electoral arrangement with any of the ruling coalition partners, which would hopefully bring it back to power.

A third fallacy about the FPTP is that it allows voters to choose between people rather than just between parties and may even give a chance for popular independent candidates to be elected. The voters are expected to assess the merit and performance of individual candidates rather than a party list as can happen in some List PR Electoral system. The BV version of the FPTP system,spanned over nearly a quarter of a century, has never returned an independent or a non-party candidate at any election held in Mauritius.

This leads us to the conclusion that a given electoral system will not necessarily work the same way in different countries. The effects of an electoral system depends, to a large extent, on the socio-political context in which it operates and on factors such as the societal structure in terms of ethnic, religious, ideological or class division and the extent to which political parties are entrenched geographically or nationally.

Proportional representation

Because of the inordinate imbalances created by the election results based on the FPTP-BV system, it is the considered view of the majority of Mauritians that some form or degree of proportionality should be introduced into our system. However, when designing a new electoral system, it is necessary to set down a list of criteria which sum up what is required to be achieved and what is required to be avoided.

The Sachs Commission, using the existing electoral system as a starting point, attempted to formulate the best of alternatives possible in a bid to meet the criteria of fairness, stability, familiarity and impact on national harmony and social progress, to avoid a 60-0 result as in 1982 and 1995, to secure a stable and effective government while preserving and maintaining the harmonious fabric of our society.

It will be for Government and ultimately the National Assembly, to decide on the type and extent of electoral reform the country requires or deserves. Informed public opinion can, and indeed should, assist in this process of decision-making and in the exercise of ?political judgment?.

In whatever scenario opted for, the electoral reform will involve a certain measure of Proportional Representation (PR).

The rationale underpinning PR systems is the deliberate reduction in disparity between a political party?s share of the national vote and its share of parliamentary seats. In other words, if a party wins 25 % of the votes, it should win approximately the same percentage of the parliamentary seats. PR is often achieved by the use of party lists, where political parties present lists of candidates to the electorate on a national basis.

The leading proponents of the PR systems associate a number of positive attributes to them, among which are the faithful translation of votes cast into seats won and relatively few wasted votes and minority parties? access to parliamentary representation. PR is more friendly to the election of women than the FPTP system, it gives rise to more efficient government and is less likely to result in situations where a single party holds all parliamentary seats.

The most common criticisms of PR are based around two broad themes: the tendency of PR systems to give rise to coalition governments and the failure of some PR systems to provide a strong linkage between an MP and his or her constituents. PR systems are also and very often criticised for providing a parliamentary stage to extremist parties, both of the right and of the left.

Among the major political parties in Mauritius, none more than the Labour Party of SSR had shown stronger aversion to the PR system, going to extent of militating against its application, in whatever form, in Mauritius. This was probably due to the fact that at a certain crucial point during the arduous pre-independence negotiations at Lancaster House, in London, the colonial powers raised the PR spectre in a bid to thwart the wish of the majority for the early accession of Mauritius to Independence. Except for the ?Parti Mauricien? of yonder days, I am not aware of any major political party which has advocated the institution of a pure PR system.

Hybrid or mixed electoral system

The MMM is the first and only party to come out openly for a hybrid system using both the FPTP and PR. In its latest brief on PR, submitted to the Sachs Commission, the MMM gave a modified version of what it originally advocated, although its leader informed the Commissioners that he still had an open mind on the issue. The PR formula of the MMM applies to any political party or alliance which, at a general election, succeeds in polling 10 % or more of the total number of votes cast. Such party or alliance shall be allocated a proportionally elected member for each 5 % of votes polled.

The additional seats shall be allocated to the most successful unreturned candidate, if any, who is a member of the party or party alliance to which such seats have been allocated. In the absence of an unreturned candidate, the seat shall be allocated to such person as may be designated by the leader of the party with no available candidate.

Such mixed or parallel system, using PR and Plurality Majority systems has the merit of being easy to implement ? as underlined by the Sachs Commission ? while guaranteeing stability. It suffers, however, from a severe drawback since it leaves almost untouched the disproportionality emanating from the present system.

Applying the formula proposed by the MMM to the 2000 general election results,when the MMM-MSM alliance with 52.3% of the votes obtained 82.6 % of the seats, it was demonstrated that for an additional 30 PR seats provided, the alliance would still receive 76.04 % of the seats, while the Labour-PMSD alliance would move up from 11.43% of the seats to 19.79% for 36.95% of votes obtained.

The Sachs Commission was in presence of and considered at least five different proposals or models and showed its clear preference for the one which I propose to elaborate on now. But first, it is worth underlining that the Commission, although of the opinion that small parties have a great deal to contribute towards political vitality, finally rallied to the opinion regarding the ?dangers of political fragmentation on communal or religious lines? and supported the idea of a 10 % threshold for parties claiming seats under PR.

All similar electoral systems have thresholds of representation, that is a minimum level of support needed to secure representation. In Germany and New Zealand, for example, there is a 5% threshold : parties which fail to obtain 5% of the vote are ineligible to be awarded seats from the PR lists. Both in Germany and in New Zeland, however, there exist ?back-door? routes for a party to be entitled to seats under PR. In the case of New Zealand a party must win at least one constituency while in the case of Germany three seats are required to by-pass the threshold requirements.

I personally believe that the threshold of 5% is quite reasonable and should apply to the small parties of Mauritius as it would favour the integration of the more resilient ones to our mainstream politics through participation in the law-making process which parliamentarism is all about.

FPTP-BV/List PR

The model which obtained the favour of the Sachs Commission is the mixed system ? FPTP-BV and PR-Party List ? which maintains the current 62-member National Assembly, with 20 constituencies each electing 3 members and Rodrigues 2 members. Provision is also made for the election of a further 30 members on the basis of lists, published in advance of elections and submitted by parties receiving more than 10% of the national vote. The list could contain the names of a restricted number of persons standing as candidates in the constituencies.

PR-Party List (List PR) involves each party presenting a list of candidates to the electorate, voters vote for the party and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of national vote. Winning candidates are taken from the lists in order of their position on the lists.

List PR encourages political parties to present socially diverse lists of candidates, with well-qualified persons having particular skills,who might be put off by the often repugnant character of electoral battles. The incentive here is to maximise the national vote of the party. The fresh experience of South Africa suggests that List PR gives the political space which allows parties to put up multi-racial and multi-religious lists of candidates. By providing extra options in the preparation of the lists, it has the potential for making a significant contribution in terms of community relations and national unity.

Political parties are, moreover, able to use the lists to promote the advancement of women politicians and provide facilities for voters to elect women candidates, thus enhancing gender representation. Although I am not particularly in favour of the quota system, I feel however that ?half of the sky?cannot be left out of politics or as badly represented as they are now. Perhaps when we come to the proposals made by the Sachs Commission in the draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill, we shall be able to go more deeply into this very important but neglected aspect of local politics.

Critics of the List PR find that it leaves too much power entrenched withing political-party headquarters and wielded by the party leadership. A candidate?s position on the list , and therefore his or her likelihood of being elected, is dependent on currying favour with the party leaders.

Be that as it may, the mixed FPTP-BV/List PR as propounded by the Sachs Commission, if retained, will have the merit of correcting the disproportionality between the number of votes received and the number of seats obtained. Strongly weighted in favour of the FPTP-BV constituencies, it ensures that the party or the alliance of parties which fare very well in the constituency elections will normally end up forming the government. It also ensures through the List PR that the leadership core of the political parties is returned to Parliament, while it provides for more opportunities of community, religious and gender representation.

It is my considered view that this hybrid system would be the most appropriate one for Mauritius, at this particular juncture.

Best loser system

The Best Loser System (BLS) received the full attention of the Sachs Commission and although one can sense where lies its sympathy, the Commission stops short of proposing its elimination. Its hope is that the List PR might ?eliminate the need to retain the BLS.?

?No issue before us aroused more intense comment? writes the Commissioners in their Report. The great majority of those who deponed criticized the BLS vehemently and contended that it violated the very essence of developing Mauritian citizenship. The best approach would be, according to the Commission, to find out ways and means of reassuring the community or communities most supportive of the BLS, that it will be subsumed into the new electoral arrangements.

No responsible Mauritian citizen would today wish the perpetuation of the BLS. On the contrary, its elimination from our Constitution has become our common concern. However, one should also be able to get to grips with the underlying reassurance which BSL offered at a specifically crucial moment in our political history and which lingered on in spite of the by and large adequate representation of the minorities ensured through the judicious choice of candidates presented at all general elections since independence, by the major national parties. The reassurance which the BSL provides today tends to be more of ?a psychological and emotional nature than a practical one.?

Let us, however, join in with the Sachs Commission?s conclusion on this delicate and sensitive issue to express the wish that undue controversy over the BSL does not distract attention from the major thrust of the electoral reforms being proposed. If wisdom prevails, the BSL would be left untouched until the next general elections are over when, on the basis of the functioning of the new electoral system, an informed decision would be taken on its relevance or non-relevance in present-day Mauritius.

Cassam Uteem

Bibliography : Report of the Commission on Constitutional and Electoral Reform, Report on the Commission on Constitutional and Electoral Reform (Annexures), Handbook of Electoral System Design - IDEA Publication, Handbook of Political Parties and Election Campaign - IDEA Publication

It would be a matter of concern to all democracy lovers if we were to perpetuate an electoral system which produces such lopsided results.

No responsible Mauritian citizen would today wish the perpetuation of the BLS. Its elimination has become our common concern.

I personally believe that the threshold of 5% is quite reasonable and should apply to the small parties of Mauritius.