As there is no ?one size that fits all? and as there is no perfect electoral system to suit all contexts and all circumstances, countries have tailored different mechanisms to address the issue of minority representation. This is based on the recognition that systematic underrepresentation of minorities could lead to serious problems of legitimacy. In divided societies, it is very crucial to design electoral systems that are all inclusive so that various groups are not politically alienated. For instance, it would have been unthinkable to devise an electoral system that is not all embracing in a society as fractious as South Africa. It induces shared goals and common values, encourages nation building and promotes social cohesiveness. It creates space for groups to find some form of expression through the political system.

Electoral systems that are successful in homogeneous societies might not necessarily work in divided countries. History, context, political environment and the specific circumstances of the country have a significant bearing on the choice of electoral system. Even if there are some timeless and universal principles that characterise voting formulae, a post conflict emerging democracy will emphasise some conditions more than an established democracy. Attributes that seem obvious to mature democratic societies assume greater importance when set in deeply divided states like South Africa,Fiji and Northern Ireland. Different arrangements exist, especially with respect to the various electoral formulae, to guarantee the inclusion of the diverse racial groups in South Africa, to avoid the political alienation of Maoris in New Zealand, to mitigate the conflict between the Catholic and the Protestant communities in Northern Ireland and to provide effective political representation to Christian and Muslim groups in Lebanon.

Constitutional engineers and electoral specialists have provided a variety of institutional arrangements so that political stakeholders have incentives to accommodate the interests and aspirations of minority groups. In many advanced societies, consensual models of democracies have emerged in which it is difficult to ignore minority votes in the political process. These democracies have embraced proportional representation system, often with low thresholds and large constituencies, to maximise the chances of minorities in electoral contests. However in the case of majoritarian electoral systems such as First Past The Post, there is no universal answer to the question of how minorities should be represented at the Parliamentary level. Some countries assure the political representation of minorities in the legislature by providing special electoral law requirements for them. They use quotas, reserved seats or affirmative actions. For instance, the electoral laws in Romania, Slovenia and Croatia all discriminate in favour of ethnic minorities to guarantee representation. There are, for instance, five reserved seats for minorities in Croatia, two in Slovenia and around fifteen in Romania. Countries like India (scheduled tribes and castes), Jordan (Christians and Circassians), Pakistan (non-Muslim minorities), Columbia (black communities and indigenous peoples), and Taiwan (the aboriginal community) also have special provisions for ethnic minority representation.

Mauritius, which is also a multi ethnic, multi racial, multi cultural, multi religious and multi lingual society like South Africa and Fiji, has followed a completely different path with respect to using the electoral system for inter ethnic accommodation and harmony. While fairness, inclusion and simplicity have characterised the electoral formula of South Africa, Mauritius has been more concerned with having an electoral system (London Agreement,1956) that attempts to reconcile the contradiction between

● voting on grounds of political principle and party rather than on race or religion; and

● providing adequate opportunity for all the main sections of the population to elect their representatives to Parliament in numbers corresponding broadly to their own weight in the community.

This has been achieved through the following combinations of plurality systems:

● in two general elections (1959 and 1963) with 40 specifically drawn single member constituencies which return MPs on a plurality of votes and giving the Governor the right to appoint nominees (a form of reserved seats) to correct for communal/ethnic underrepresentation;

● since 1967 by having 20 specifically drawn,three member and one two member constituencies and 8 Best Losers seats (BLS) which are used to mitigate communal underrepresentation;

The current Mauritius electoral system is quite unique in four of its features. These attributes are specifically designed to enable minority representation in a majoritarian electoral system.

They are:

● specially drawn electoral districts;

● malapportionment of constituencies;

● three member constituencies with a mandatory three vote per elector;

● Best Loser System.

<B>20 specially drawn ?three member? constituencies</B>

The FPTP electoral system with single member constituencies makes it very difficult for minorities and women to gain representation. After the 1963 elections, it was also decided to do away with the system where the Governor could appoint some members in order to mitigate ethnic underrepresentation following elections. For the elections held in 1959 and 1963, the Governor appointed 12 and 15 nominated members respectively to ensure better ethnic representation in the Assembly. In 1964, Professor de Smith proposed a significant reduction in the number of members appointed by the Governor. However to ensure fair ethnic representation he had suggested two mixed electoral systems for Mauritius. One was a combination of FPTP in three member constituencies and a Limited Vote while the other was a mix of FPTP in two member ridings and a mild form of PR in larger electoral districts.

In 1966,the Banwell Commission recommended 20 three member constituencies for Mauritius and one two member district for Rodrigues. However the boundaries were drawn in such a way as to assure each main component of the population the maximum chance of electing representatives to the Legislature in the areas where it is numerically strong. The drawing of the 20 constituencies followed more or less the same logic of the boundaries for the 40 single member constituencies that existed for the elections of 1959 and 1963. The forty single member constituencies were brought down to 20 three member constituencies in such a way that the dilution of the minorities was minimized. The risks of affecting the electoral system were considerably diminished by an intelligent pairing of constituencies. This was an example of electoral engineering to fit the context and the circumstances of the day. More importantly it was done to allay the fears of minorities.

<B>The logic of malapportionment</B>

Mauritius implicitly uses malapportionment to ensure that the ethnic balance of the constituencies is not disturbed by either demographic changes or population movements across the country. The consequence of maintaining such a balance is a huge disparity in the size of the twenty constituencies (around 55 000 electors in Constituency 14 and around 24 000 in constituency 3). It is simply amazing that in such a small country, there are such huge differences in the population density of the twenty districts. Such significant variation in the number of electors in many constituencies is tolerated in spite of the fact that it goes counter to the basic principles laid down in the Constitution of Mauritius. These state that the number of electors in each constituency: ?may as nearly be equal as is reasonably practicable to the population quota, subject to certain critreria like means of communication, geographical features, density of population and the boundaries of administrative areas? (Constitution of Mauritius,1967, Section 39 (3)).

In 1967, the difference between the constituency with the lowest number of electors in Mauritius (number 7 with 13620) and the highest number (number 15 with 19650) was already quite high at 5110. It represented a ratio of 1.4 between the largest and the smallest. Such disparity has worsened over the years to reach in 2000 a ratio of 2.3 between the two (51305 for constituency number 14 and 22779 for number 3).

While it may make sense to correct such anomalies (there has been some marginal adjustments over the years) and to draw new boundaries for the 20 constituencies, there is the apprehension that such redistricting could upset the balance that was struck by Trustam-Eve and Banwell to assure a fair representation of all sections of the Mauritian population. This is essentially the Mauritian way of enabling minority representation in a plurality electoral system!

<B>The rationale of three member constituencies</B>

Mauritius changed from single member constituency to three member districts in the 1967 elections,except for Rodrigues where there are two members in the constituency. The relatively larger size constituencies (20 three member ridings compared with the previous 40 single member ditrict) lowers the importance of one particular communal group on the outcome of the election. The FPTP system with 3 members by constituencies allows a balanced ticket with candidates from different ethnic and communal backgrounds. The fielding of candidates also takes into account the diversity of the Hindu Community. The system thus not only allows for broad based representation in terms of the four communities, but it also enables the different components of the Hindu community to have a share of representation. A very delicate balance is struck so that everybody is perceived to be given a fair chance to gain political representation so that there is no feeling of resentment at being excluded from the political process.

From an electoral strategic standpoint, the fielding of the candidates usually respect two important objectives:

● to reflect the socio-ethnic composition of the constituency so as to maximise the probability of electoral success;

● to ensure a degree of Parliamentary representation for all the components of the population among the 60 candidates fielded country-wide;

The larger size constituencies were deemed to lower the importance of one particular communal group on the outcome of the election. The compulsory three votes would allow balanced tickets in terms of communal, gender, socio economic considerations and would strengthen party allegiance. In the specific case of Mauritius, it emphasizes diversity and encourages minority representation. While women are severely underrepresented in the Mauritius? electoral system, the level of socio ethnic representation is relatively fair and broad based. This would have been very difficult with single member ridings. This led Sachs to argue that: ?the bloc-of-three vote appears to have achieved substantial success in encouraging parties to straddle community divides when nominating candidates. This is not simply because of any subjective desire to appear politically correct but because of the advantages which the bloc-of-three system gives to broadly based tickets. The result is that no community is left out? .

<B>The Best Loser System</B>

The Best Loser system is only the fourth element of the institutional arrangement to ensure broad based representation. It also aims at mitigating communal/ethnic underrepresentation in Parliament.The eight Best Loser seats are divided into two sets of four seats each as follows:

● the first four Best Loser seats go to appropriate (underrepresented) communities irrespective of party, provided the candidates belong to a party;

● the second set of four seats are then distributed on the basis of both appropriate party and underrepresented communities with a view to redressing any imbalance caused by the allocation of the first four seats.

A constitutional amendment was made in 1992 to ensure that a party restores the balance in respect of the second set of four seats, irrespective of community, should candidates from the appropriate (underrepresented) community be unavailable. As a result of this amendment, two Hindus, Ramdass and Yeerigadoo, were appointed Best Loser MPs in the 2000 elections for the MSM-MMM alliance even if Hindus were not statistically underrepresented. They were chosen as there was no candidate from either the Muslim or the General Population or the Chinese community to appoint with a view to restoring the balance. All GP and Chinese candidates of the MSM-MMM alliance were elected while the two defeated Muslim candidates from that alliance were already appointed Best Losers. Had it not been for the 1992 amendment, the two Hindus would not have been designated Best Losers, as was the case in the 1991 elections when the three losing candidates of the MSM-MMM alliance, all Hindus, did not enter Parliament as Best Losers. Only four Best Losers were thus appointed in 1991.

A fact hardly known to the public is that the current BLS is very different from what the constitutional and electoral experts (Banwell and his two assessors) had proposed. There are three major differences. First there was a provision for 5 Best Loser seats only to correct communal/ethnic underrepresentation as opposed to the eight that was agreed at the last minute between Stonehouse and the local political elites of the time. Second the method of allocation was different. It was recommended to allot the five Best Loser seats on the basis of both underrepresented parties and underrepresented communities. The five seats would go to those whose party and community were underrepresented compared with their party?s share of the total vote and their community?s share of the total population. Third, to avoid a multiplication of parties along communal lines, a threshold of 10 per cent of the national votes and winning at least one seat out of the 60 were imposed as conditions to be eligible for these 5 seats.

The underlying principle of the four special features of the uniquely tailored electoral system was to provide for better descriptive representation in a plural society, especially for minority groups who were concerned about being excluded from the political game. These features have become key components of the Mauritius? electoral system and they somehow afforded a degree of reassurance to some communities who were afraid of electoral marginalization in the aftermath of Independence in 1968. It is crucial to understand that the BLS is only one component in the overall voting system. And as Sachs has argued:

? it is important to remember that from its inception the BLS had relatively weak numerical impact on voting strength in Parliament..and the degree of reassurance it provides is more of a symbolical and emotional nature than a practical one.?

Sachs and the two other commissioners went to the extent of arguing that ?the degree of correction balance which the BLS provides tends to be tangential rather than substantive, especially when one takes into account the advantages of the three member constituencies in presenting a balanced ticket?.

It is true that the BLS acts as an ?insurance factor? for some communities in a plural society. However in the context of Mauritius,it is fair to argue that the first three special features (specially drawn boundaries,unequal number of voters per constituency and three member districts) have together played a very significant role in ensuring broad based ethnic representation even if most, if not all, attention seems to be focused on the BLS as the only mechanism to provide comfort to some segments of the population.

If one were to keep the first three features of the current electoral system (specially drawn constituencies,tolerate malapportionment and three member constituencies) and subsumed the 8 BL seats into a party PR list,one could easily achieve a broad based Parliament that reflect the diversity of the nation.

The advantages of a PR list (as it exists in South Africa where not only the four main different racial groups but also the various different sub linguistic groups are represented) are three fold:

i) it lowers the disparity between votes obtained and seats won (the fairness factor);

ii) it allows for a better representation of women (the gender factor);

iii) it ensures a broad based Parliament that reflects the rainbowness of the nation (the inclusion factor).

The onus will be on political parties to ensure that their constituency and party lists reflects diversity and plurality. Otherwise they will be punished by the electorate as has been the case in many countries. If we have a closed, rank-ordered and pre detremined PR Party List and allows for many double candidacies (a candidate can be both a constituency and a Party list candidate), it should be very easy to achieve the three objectives mentioned above (party fairness,gender fairness and inclusion fairness). On the other hand, the 62 FPTP seats will guarantee stability and governability.This two tiered voting formula (say 75% First Past the Post and 25% list PR) is the best way forward in the current political predicament. But obviously some persist in believing that they are smarter than others and want to take a partisan advantage of electoral reform. My experience and findings as a researcher of over 200 voting formulae across the world show that under these circumstances the prospects for electoral reform are unfortunately doomed. I sincerely hope that I am wrong. We shall see.

By Rama SITHANEN </B>