The four problems of our FPTP electoral system are known.It often produces a huge disproportionality between votes polled and seats obtained by parties.In 1987,the MMM captured 35 % of seats with 48.1 % of votes while the MSM/LP/PMSD took 65 % of seats with 49.9 % of votes.A difference of only 1.8 % in votes produced a huge gap of 30 % in seats.At times it amplifies this unfairness when one alliance obtains 100 % of seats with around 55 % of votes,thus leaving no representation at all to another party with 40 % of votes.This is the famous 60-0.There is also the likelihood of a party winning more votes losing the election. Fortunately it has not happened in Mauritius.It occurred twice in New Zealand which had the same FPTP system as us.This provoked outrage and instability.As a result,the electoral formula was changed and New Zealand today has a mixed system. However we had two near misses in 1967 and 1987 when winners could have become losers.Finally,women are severely underrepresented. with only 5.7 % of female MPs in Parliament

There are two lethal flaws,eight major defects and two technical problems with the proposals contained in the Bill.

Major defects

1. The low number of PR Mps

Sachs,Ahnee and Tendon reached the conclusion that there is need for 30 PR Mps if the objective of reform is to introduce an element of fairness in the system, as they were tasked to keep the 70 FPTP seats.The split would be 70 % FPTP and 30 % PR seats.In Germany and Russia it is 50/50 between the two components of the mixed system.In New Zealand which has changed from FPTP to a mixed formula,the share of PR Mps is around 45 %.Lesotho recently switched from FPTP to a mixed system and it has 66.6 % FPTP and 33.3 % PR seats. The 14 PR seats out of a total of 80,as proposed by Govt, will account for only 17.5 % of seats. As it is a very low percentage,its effect will be very marginal and will hardly affect the degree of unfairness of the system. It means that a party with 45 % of the votes could end up with only 6 seats out of 80 or 7.5 % of all seats while one with 51 % could end up with 92.5 % of seats. In 1995, the MSM would have obtained only 3 seats with 20 % of the votes.While 3 is certainly better than nothing, it is a far cry from what anybody would consider a fair and a just system.This anomaly arises also because of the method chosen to allot the 14 seats.

2. The unfairness of the parallel method

Govt proposes to attribute the 14 PR seats on a parallel basis.There are broadly two ways of alloting PR seats.The parallel mode distributes PR seats regardless of what happens in elections at the constituency level.As a result the party which has most Mps at the FPTP mode also takes the lion share of PR seats.This leads to a widening of the difference in seats between the winner and the second party.In 1995,with the FPTP,the LP/MMM alliance had a 60 seat margin over the MSM.With the proposed system, the gap, instead of narrowing, would have risen to 66 seats.How can this be fair ? It is so unfair that it is not used in advanced democracies like Germany, New Zealand, Italy, Wales and Scotland.Instead,they employ the compensatory mode which corrects partially for the unfairness in the results at the constituency level.Sachs and Collendavelloo have recommended the compensatory mode to apportion the PR seats and have categorically rejected the parallel system. Lesotho,a SADC country,which recently evolved from FPTP to a mixed system,also has a compensatory formula.The difference between the two modes is huge.With the parallel mode,the MSM would have won only 3 seats or 3.7 % of all seats while polling 20 % of the votes in 1995. A compensatory formula would have given 14 #to the MSM.It is fairer.This is why the parallel system is called ?panadol to cure cancer?. The combination of a low number of PR seats and its attribution by a parallel mode will hardly make any difference to the degree of unfairness of the current system. Evaluating 30 PR seats along a parallel mode, Sachs concluded that ?it is precisely the smallness of its impact that reduces its attractions for present purposes?.And now Govt is suggesting 14 PR seats!

3. Appointing PR Mps from among Best Losers

In theory,there are two ways of returning PR MPs.These are the Party list and the Best Loser system.However the Best Loser system is so poor and so dangerous that there is no country in the world that uses it to return PR Mps.Yet this is precisely what Govt is proposing.Simply unthinkable.All countries use Party lists. From Germany to New Zealand,from Wales to Scotland, from Italy to Lesotho, from Hungary to Bolivia, from Japan to Venezuela. Even countries with low democratic credentials like Mexico, Russia, Armenia,Ukraine and Macedonia use party list. Surely all of them cannot be wrong. It would be an unmitigated disaster to return PR Mps through a Best Loser system in a plural and multi faith country like Mauritius.Sachs has well articulated this danger when he states ?its capacity to impact negatively on innnerparty relationship,its propensity to intensify communal tensions and ?.its unacceptable potential for destabilisation of national unity?

A Best loser system will provoke bitter intra party infighting during elections as candidates from the same party will use communal,casteist,racial,religious and other below the belt arguments against their own colleagues.This is patently against party interests and social cohesion.If fairly homogenous countries like Germany and New Zealand refuse to use Best loser system to return PR MPs,one wonders how a plural society like ours can even contemplate such an eventuality.Already social cohesion is weak,fragile and vulnerable. Incentivising and rewarding ethnic,communal and racial electioneering is tantamount to pouring fuel on fire.This must be the height of irresponsibility.

4. Very unfair to women

The proposal is extremely unfair to women on four counts. First, it guarantees only 7 seats out of 80 to women. For a cohort that accounts for 51 % of the population,a representation of 8.75 % is hardly a favour. If anything, it is insulting. Second, the Bill is eloquently silent on the 62 constituency seats.Women will thus have only a given share of 17.5 % ( 14 seats out of 80) of the total seats; however there is nothing for them in 77.5 % of the seats ( 62 FPTP seats out of 80). Simply amazing.Third they can only enter Parliament if they lose the elections, thus carrying the stigma of being second best Mps.This is dreadful,especially when better and simpler avenues exist for women to become MPs. Fourth, these very few women will have to fight it out vehemently, if not viciously, on the basis of race, ethnicity, caste and religion to have a chance to be a Best Loser since only the most successful unreturned women candidates would be the lucky ones.

5. Winners could become losers

Surprisingly,there is a major flaw at clause 10 of the Bill concerning the method to return the 4 ?communal? best losers.In the current system, there are two sets of four best losers.The first set of four seats is attributed to the four most successful unreturned candidates hailing from underrepresented communities,regardless of parties while the second set of four seats corrects for any party imbalance that could have been caused by the appointment of the first set of four Best Losers.Thus if the first set of four seats is attributed to the second most successful party, the second set of four seats should be awarded to the most successful party so as not to change the election results. The second set of 4 Best losers acts as a guarantee that the will of the people cannot be changed and that winners cannot become losers after the allotment of the 8 Best Loser seats.

Surprisingly,the Bill proposes to abolish the second set of 4 Best Losers while retaining the first set of four seats. According to clause 10,the 4 ?communal? best loser seats will be allocated to the most successful unreturned candidates belonging to the appropriate community, regardless of parties.By eliminating the second set of four best loers, the Govt is opening the door for a winner to become a loser,following the allocation of these 4 seats. Consider a tight race with one party taking 32 seats and another 30.If each is entitled to 7 PR seats out of the 14,that would give a tally of 39 against 37. The winner still has a majority of 2 seats. However as the four Best Loser seats are attributed to underrepresented communities irrespective of political parties,the second most successful party may take all 4 seats.Thus it would have 41 seats against 39 for the actual winner. A winner has been transformed into a loser.This is totally unacceptable.There is a similar problem with clause 11 (b) in case a vacancy arises. Here also a winner could become a loser. It is precisely to avoid such anomaly that we have two sets of 4 Best Losers.This is the problem when people with little knowledge in electoral system try to design reform without heeding the advice of experts in the field.

6. A very complicated system

Electoral experts argue that one of the most important features of an electoral system is its simplicity,its familiarity and its ease of understanding.The new proposal must be one of the most complicated electoral systems in the world. Already few people understand how the Best Loser system works in practice. Often the Electoral Commission has had to ask for a ruling from the Supreme Court to award some Best Loser seats.Now we will have three types of best losers.One for women,one for men and women and one for ethnic underrepresentation. Extremely complicated,especially when simpler formulae exist and have been recommended by electoral specialists.

7. Very high eligibility threshold

Even if one understands the absolute need in a multi faith country to discourage single issue political formations,many electoral experts would argue that a 10 % threshold to be eligible for PR seats is on the very high side. It will penalise many parties.The international trend is around 4 % to 5 % of national votes,even in plural societies. My simulations show that a 5 % national limit would still discourage openly communal parties.

8. Inconsistency with no threshold for a Best Loser seat

The rationale for a very high 10 % threshold to have a PR seat is to make it difficult, if not impossible, for openly communal parties to enter Parliament and to encourage broad church formations.Yet there is no such deterrent to become eligible for a Best Loser seat. As a result we could have a ridiculous situation where a national party with 9,99 % of vote is denied one PR seat while a communal one with less than 1 % of vote could obtain a Best Loser seat.This is totally unfair.In 1995, Beeharry, a Muslim from a single issue party,was awarded a Best Loser seat even if his party won a very insignificant percentage of national vote. Soodhun, a Muslim from a mainstream party,was denied one seat while his party,the MSM, polled 20 per cent of the national vote.To add insult to injury,Beeharry garnered only 4405 votes while Soodhun collected 7416 votes (68 % more ). How can we accept such unfairness, especially when the solution to avoid such anomalies is very simple ?

Lethal flaws

1. Reject what experts propose and propose what experts reject

Any electoral specialist would be deeply shocked by the contents of the Bill. They are fundamentally flawed,completely opposite to best international practices,totally contrary to what electoral experts have recommended in the Sachs report, very wide apart from the proposals of the Select Committee and wholly antagonistic to what an eminent world constitutionalist and electoral expert has recently advised on this very Bill. Assume someone has a heart problem.He consults a world known cardiologist who diagnoses the ailment.Not only does the heart specialist prescribe the right medication but he also informs the patient of the worst remedy for the disease. However the patient decides to consult someone who is not even a nursing officer and the latter recommends exactly what the eminent doctor has thoroughly rejected.Yet the patient accepts it.

Government set up an Independent Commission chaired by Albie Sachs to make proposals on the best way to cure the defects of the FPTP system.It also appointed a Select Committee to that effect.Not only has the Sachs Commission proposed the best formula (the famous Model C),but it has also categorically rejected what it considers to be the worst solution ( Model A).What is surprising is that Govt rejects what the experts have recommended and endorses a solution that is worse than the one turned down by the specialists.Sachs and Collendavelloo have unreservedly thrown out the proposal to have 30 PR Mps along a parallel mode,appointed from among best losers. They have given very robust reasons to support their recommendations.Yet the proposal of Govt is to have 14 PR Mps along a parallel formula ,returned from among best losers.Simply amazing.

2. Include discriminatory practice in the Constitution

Sections 3 and 16 of the Constitution prohibit discrimination on many grounds,including sex.Under the pretext of positive discrimination,the proposal will include discrimination on the basis of gender in our Constitution.This is a violation of the fundamental clauses of our Constitution and represents a very dangerous precedent.The more so as there is no need to tinker with the Supreme law of the Land if we follow best international practice to ensure better political representation of women. In countries like South Africa,Germany,Norway, Italy, Sweden,Denmark, Mozambique, Argentina,Bolivia,to name a few, political parties provide for gender fairness.Gender discrimination does not feature in the Constitution. Sachs,one of the best Constitutionalists in Africa,concluded that

?we endorse the view that the major responsibility for correcting the massive gender imbalance rests with the parties?.

Technical problems

1. Wrong formula to compute PR seats

The formula at 5 (3) (c) of the Bill to determine the number of proportionately elected members per party is not in line with best international practice.The share of votes cast in favour of a party must be divided not by the total number of valid votes cast at the election but by the total number of valid votes minus the votes of parties not eligible to PR seats (those which have not polled at least 10 %). Assume Party A polls 50 % of votes and Party B 35 % and there is no other party with 10 % of votes.The share of Party A in the 14 PR seats is not 50 % but 55.5 % ( 50 % of 90 %).The denominator has to be adjusted.This is how it happens in most countries. Otherwise it is impossible to allocate all 14 PR seats.

2.Which formula to allot PR seats

The Bill is silent on which mathematical formula will be used to attribute the 14 PR seats. There are two broad formulae.The highest average and the largest remainder methods.One has the feeling that the D?Hondt formula would be used.It is the least proportional as it favours the largest party as opposed to St Lague which is neutral between large and other parties.Other countries use the Hare or the Droop formula.The exact mathematical formula should be clearly spelt out to avoid any confusion later on.