The debate hinges on the relative importance of stability and fairness in a mixed electoral system. It constitutes the major difference between the two alternatives of the Select Committee. How much stability and fairness should the mixed formula contain?

One should understand what determines stability and fairness in a mixed FPTP/PR system to be in a position to make an informed judgement. It is a truism that the FPTP mode of a mixed system is designed to enhance stability as it gives a huge advantage to the winning party while the PR component purports to ensure fairness. There are many forms of mixed electoral systems. Some prioritise stability while others encourage fairness. There are basically five factors that determine the balance between stability and fairness in mixed systems. They are: 1. the share of seats between FPTP and PR modes; 2. the eligible threshold for PR; 3. the district size for PR allotment; 4. the mathematical formula for distributing PR seats; 5. the choice of parallel or compensatory formula to allot PR seats.

<B>The number of seats in each mode</B>

Germany, Japan and Yougoslavia all have mixed electoral systems. However, the split between FPTP and PR seats is very different. Germany has 50% of each, Japan has 60% FPTP and 40% PR while in Yougoslavia 57 % of MPs are returned through PR and 43% along FPTP. The rule is very simple.The more FPTP seats a mixed system has, the more stable it tends to be, while the more PR seats it features,the fairer it is. The two alternatives of the Select Committee tilt the balance heavily towards stability with 62 FPTP seats and 30 PR representatives. And as the 8 Best Loser seats are maintained, the final outcome is 70 FPTP seats and 30 PR seats. FPTP seats therefore account for 70% of the total while PR seats represent 30% only. The choice of 70 FPTP seats out of 100 signals that the vote for stability is 2,33 times more important than the vote for fairness.

<B>As the Sachs Commission rightly puts it</B>

?This model would lean in favour of stability by ensuring that the number of PR seats was limited to a figure not exceeding 30. Whether or not the BLS is retained, the fact that there will be 62 members elected on a constituency basis and only a maximum of thirty elected according to the compensatory PR system, will load the House heavily on the side of the constituency form of representation. The exaggerated strength of the leading party produced by the FPTP will further emphasise the relative strength in the House of such party.? ( Para 39).

<B>1-0 for stability. The eligible threshold </B>

Some electoral systems encourage broad representation while others penalise small parties. Countries which want to exclude small parties from Parliament impose a high threshold (Sweden at 4% and Germany at 5%) of national votes to be entitled to PR seats while those that prefer inclusion of many parties either have no threshold (South Africa) or very low ones (less than 1% in Netherlands). It was not easy for the Sachs Commission to recommend an exceptionally high threshold of 10%. In most countries, this would be considered very unfair. Out of almost 100 countries that use threshold, only two, Turkey and Seychelles, have a 10% limit. Most, including many deeply divided societies, are around 5%. In Turkey, it was done by the mainstream parties to keep others out of Parliament. However, at the last election, those who wanted to use the electoral system for their own benefit have been ?hoisted with their own petard?. None of the five main parties that was represented in Parliament after the 1999 elections captured a single of the 550 seats as they did not attain the national threshold of 10%. A very high threshold can lead to a very disproportional outcome because of many wasted votes. In Turkey?s last elections,the winner captured 66% of seats with only 34% of votes as 46 % of the votes were wasted because of the very high 10% threshold. The system has deprived 46% of Turks of any representation,thus giving a huge bias to stability as major parties benefit from the wasted votes. It is impossible for a single issue party to poll 10% of national votes in Mauritius. As a matter of fact, it is much easier for a communal party to gain a seat through the BLS than through a PR with 10% of national votes. It occurred in 1995 because of a major loophole in the BLS formula.

<B>2-0 for stability. National PR list</B>

In some countries, PR members are elected in multiseat districts in proportion to the number of votes received (Germany) in each district. The country is divided into many districts and the threshold applies in the district. Elsewhere, the entire country is taken as a single electoral district (Netherlands ). It is clear that it is easier for some extremist parties to reach the threshold in smaller districts than in larger ones, especially if there is geographic concentration of their potential supporters. The two alternatives of the Select Committee recommend a national threshold, not a regional one. As such, it favours large formations and is therefore biased towards stability over fairness. In Turkey, some parties captured close to 35% of the votes in many districts,but as they did reach 10% of national vote, they had no elected representative in Parliament.

<B>3-0 for stability. Mathematical formula to allot PR seats </B>

The accuracy of representation in a PR mode depends also on the specific formula used for allocating such seats.There are many mathematical formulae. Some are neutral between large and small parties while others give preference to either large or small formations. The Select Committee has recommended the D?Hondt formula which is biased towards large parties compared to Sainte Lague and modified Sainte Lague, which do not grant such favour. Even if the effect is small, it signals a preference of stability over fairness as small parties are penalized.

<B>4-0 for stability. Parallel and Compensatory PR </B>

A parallel PR mode returns candidates in complete disregard of constituency elections while the compensatory PR determines the apportionment of PR seats while taking into account the constituency outcomes. A parallel PR does not recognise ALL the votes cast in BOTH modes in alloting PR seats. It could thus lead to huge disparities between overall votes and total seats. A compensatory PR system includes ALL the votes cast in BOTH modes. It recognises the unfairness of the constituency results in apportioning PR seats.The compensatory formula is adopted by all democracies with mixed models that strike a balance between stability and fairness. This is the case in New Zealand, Germany, Scotland andWales. It is also used in Lesotho, which moved from a FPTP to a mixed system in 2001. On the other hand, countries, which have recently embraced democracy but hardly value fairness, use parallel systems. Russia and Ukraine are such examples. While both Russia and Germany have mixed electoral system with 50% of seats returned with FPTP and 50% with PR, Russia uses a parallel PR while Germany applies a compensatory one.While both provide for representation,the degree of fairness is very different.In Russia, a party that polls 40% of the votes may end up with only 20% of the seats even if it has lost all constituency contests and there are 50% PR seats. In Germany, it could receive around 30% of seats as the PR allotment corrects, to some extent, the unfairness of FPTP results. If there are only 30 PR seats,the level of unfairness will rise as the party with 40% of votes will get only 12% of seats in a parallel system.

If parallel mode is used, then 5-0 for stability.

If compensatory mode applies, then 4-1 for stability.

Is it fair to allow stability to win on all five attributes, thus relegating fairness to mere tokenism? One alternative of the Select Committee goes for 4-1 while the other hits very hard against fairness with a resounding 5-0 for stability.