Submitted to: The Office of the Prime Minister Republic of Mauritius

In response to: Communiqué of 2 December 2025 inviting public and stakeholder submissions on electoral reform

Submitted by: L’express (La Sentinelle Ltd) Prepared by the Office of the Director of Publications of La Sentinelle, Nad Sivaramen.

I. Institutional context and purpose

1. L’express submits the present memorandum in response to the public consultation process initiated by the Prime Minister’s Office on electoral reform.

2. As a newspaper of record with a sustained engagement in constitutional, electoral, and governance debates, l’express has, over several decades, contributed to public understanding through investigative journalism, academic commentary, legal analysis, and comparative research.

3. This submission consolidates those contributions into a structured position paper grounded in constitutional law, political science, and comparative democratic practice.

4. The purpose of this memorandum is not partisan advocacy, but the articulation of principled recommendations aimed at strengthening democratic legitimacy, representational fairness, and institutional coherence in Mauritius.

II. Foundational requirement: an updated national census

5. No electoral reform can claim democratic credibility while resting on demographic data that no longer reflect social reality.

6. Mauritius’s electoral architecture – particularly the Best Loser System (BLS)– continues to rely on the 1972 population census, a dataset now universally acknowledged as obsolete.

7. This reliance constitutes a constitutional and democratic anomaly. Representation in a democratic system presupposes accurate knowledge of the population being represented.

8. An electoral system structured on a demographic snapshot more than half a century old undermines the principles of popular sovereignty, equality of the vote, and legitimacy of representation.

9. L’express therefore submits that a modern, comprehensive national census is a necessary precondition to any meaningful electoral reform.

10. Where constitutionally required, this must be followed by a properly defined electoral census, aligned with contemporary demographic realities and judicial standards.

11. Reform initiatives that bypass this foundational step risk becoming cosmetic adjustments rather than genuine democratic renewal.

III. Abolition of the best loser system and the end of ethnic classification

12. The Best Loser System was conceived as a transitional corrective in a specific historical context.

13. While it contributed to early post-independence stability, it has since produced enduring structural effects incompatible with a modern democratic order.

14. The BLS institutionalizes ethnic categorization, compels candidates to self-identify communally, and perpetuates identity-based political engineering.

15. Constitutionally, the BLS depends on two explicit data points:

(a) the proportional composition of communities as established by census data; and

(b) the communal distribution of elected members of Parliament.¹

16. When either data set is inaccurate or obsolete, the constitutional integrity of the system is compromised.

17. Mauritian jurisprudence, decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and findings of United Nations human rights bodies have consistently emphasized this requirement.

18. L’express therefore supports the complete abolition of the Best Loser System.

19. This abolition must be accompanied by the removal of any compulsory ethnic or communal declaration by candidates.

20. Retaining the BLS while rendering communal identification optional is legally incoherent and normatively contradictory.

IV. Fairer representation and electoral system design

21. Mauritius’s First Past The Post (FPTP) system produces significant disparities between votes cast and seats obtained.

22. It also generates pronounced inequalities among constituencies, resulting in unequal weight of votes.

23. These distortions have been documented in multiple reform reports over several decades.²

24. L’express does not advocate the abandonment of constituency-based representation.

25. It supports the introduction of a limited and carefully calibrated proportional component.

26. Such a component must be subject to strict safeguards, including:

(a) a reasonable electoral threshold to prevent excessive fragmentation

(b) transparent and judicially reviewable seat-allocation formulas

(c) mechanisms to prevent chronic overrepresentation of dominant parties

27. Electoral reform must correct representational inequities without undermining governability or institutional stability.

V. Gender representation as a democratic requirement

28. Women remain significantly underrepresented in the National Assembly, despite constituting a majority of the electorate.

29. This underrepresentation is structural rather than incidental.

30. L’express supports binding gender-corrective mechanisms, particularly within any proportional or list-based component of the system.

31. These mechanisms may include:

(a) mandatory gender-balanced or alternating (“zebra”) lists

(b) minimum representation thresholds

(c) enforceable sanctions for non-compliance

32. Gender parity in political representation flows directly from constitutional principles of equality and effective participation in public life.

VI. Transparency and regulation of political financing

33. Electoral reform cannot be meaningfully pursued in isolation from political finance regulation.

34. Without robust oversight, proportionality risks reinforcing entrenched power networks rather than correcting democratic imbalance.

35. L’express recommends:

(a) updated and enforceable campaign spending ceilings

(b) independent audits of party and candidate accounts

(c) timely public disclosure of political donations

(d) effective sanctions for breaches of electoral finance laws

36. Transparency in political financing is indispensable to restoring public trust and ensuring fair electoral competition.

VII. Constitutional coherence and institutional safeguards

37. Electoral reform must be embedded within a coherent constitutional framework.

38. Piecemeal reform risks institutional dissonance, particularly where electoral mechanisms are altered without addressing coalition governance and party discipline.

39. Reform should therefore:

(a) be constitutionally integrated rather than modular;

(b) involve meaningful public participation;

(c) strengthen the independence and technical capacity of electoral management bodies;

(d) remain subject to judicial oversight.

VIII. Conclusion

40. Electoral reform in Mauritius is not a recurring technical exercise but a test of democratic maturity.

41. Adjusting seat numbers or rebranding mechanisms will not, by themselves, restore legitimacy.

42. Democracy deepens when institutions reflect contemporary social realities, when representation is equitable, and when political power is exercised transparently.

43. This requires political courage: updating foundational data, abandoning outdated corrective devices, and regulating areas of entrenched opacity.

44. L’express submits that democracy does not grow by appearing larger, but by becoming more coherent, inclusive, and credible.

Footnote References

⚫ Banwell Commission Report (1966), Report of the Commission on Electoral Boundaries and Representation.

⚫ Sachs Report (2002), Electoral Reform in Mauritius; Sachs Review Committee Report (2004–2005).

⚫ Carcassonne Report (2011), Réflexion constitutionnelle sur le système électoral mauricien.

⚫ Collendavelloo Report (2014), Modernizing the Electoral System.

⚫ Relevant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Mauritius, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and observations of the UN Human Rights Committee.

⚫ Several research articles on Electoral Reform by Dr Rama Sithanen (published in L’express 2004-2025)