WHEREAS I welcome the support of ex-President Cassam Uteem for the mixed or compensatory Proportional Representation (PR) option (Tribune 5 Jan 2004), I must highlight its potential ?banana skin? effects on our electoral representation.

I fully concur with Mr Uteem that the efficacy of an electoral system hinges on the specificities of the country ? ethnic, religious, class structure, political history, voting patterns, etc. I will argue that these very specificities undermine mixed PR in Mauritius.

The virtues of mixed PR were enunciated in the Report of the Sachs Commission. Mixed PR has the ability of attributing each party a percentage of seats corresponding more or less to the percentage of national votes that it attracts. That?s fine ? everyone wants it.

The problem however lies in the mechanism. Mixed PR operates in 2 rounds. First, there are the traditional constituency elections, which we are familiar with. Then, there is a compensatory round. If a party is under-represented in percentage of seats compared to its percentage of national votes, then it is entitled to additional seats, which will be awarded according to the Party List of ranked candidates that it would have provided prior to the elections.

Mere tokens

In theory, it has been argued that such a Party List would allow for more women and technocrats to enter our National Assembly. Racial and religious groups could also enhance their representation. I strongly doubt that legislation would be voted to make these ideals become reality. It is more likely that the politburo and heavyweight constituency-running candidates will figure well above the intended beneficiaries in the Party List. Indeed, they will be mere tokens at the bottom of the Party List, with little chance of being elected.

The party establishment can indeed seriously abuse the Party List. In the Sep 2002 election for the Rodrigues Regional Assembly, where candidates running in constituencies were not allowed to appear on Party List, the leader of the eventual-losing party

(Mr Johnson Roussety) chose not to run in any constituency but rather listed himself first on his Party List. And guess what? He got elected but the leader of the winning party (Mr Serge Clair) ran as a constituency candidate and got defeated. A repeat of this perversion is not unlikely in Mauritius: the leader of a winning party being forced to run in a constituency (as party lists do not guarantee his ?repêchage?) while the leader of a losing party having to do nothing and yet almost sure to be elected thanks to his top position on the party list.

In the recent Nov 2003 elections in Japan, a scandal-plagued politician, who was soundly repudiated by his constituency electorate, nevertheless entered the Diet, no thanks to his high positioning on his Party List.

More fundamentally, is it equitable to have 2 lists of candidates? Why should constituency candidates and electoral agents sweat and toil while party list candidates rest far from the fray? Why should a best-losing candidate lose by a mere dozen of votes and stand no change of ?repêchage? if he-she does not appear on a party list? Conceptually, mixed PR is akin to the now-defunct episode of reserved seats at Catholic secondary schools, albeit to a lower percentage. And this time, it is the bias of the party leadership to contend with. This obviously would not be subject to litigation in front of the Privy Council but it will certainly not democratize party or State politics.

Our politburos are themselves not ready for mixed PR. This is why the Select Committee on Electoral Reform is yet to utter an opinion since May 2002. The ?macadam? appears to be the thinking that a party which obtains a majority of constituency and best loser seats should be the ultimate winner under mixed PR. This can only be guaranteed under 2 conditions, namely either (1) the party obtains a pro rata majority of the votes or (2) irrespective of the percentage of votes, the number of constituency and best loser seats already gives it a majority at the National Assembly.

Electoral reform is needed. A hybrid solution like mixed PR can open a can of worms. Two simpler options ought to be given more consideration. Their ?commonality? is that all candidates are treated equitably and the results are ?clair et net?.

Power-hungry politicians

First, straight party list PR which will promote elections at the national rather than at the constituency level. The current system of PPS can be maintained as conduit between the government and constituency electorates. Each party ranks their candidates and these are selected according to the tally of votes it attracts. It has often been argued that this option is not conducive to uni-party government but more so to coalition government. Lest we disappoint power-hungry politicians, what is wrong when parties coalesce to advance the national agenda? Will we not be the better for it?

Second, we can generalize our Best Loser system to ?Vote x, elect x+1? in all constituencies. I have written about the merits of such a ?Block+1? option as early as Feb 2002. In short, it is familiar; it affords more holistic representation for a constituency at the National Assembly, it guarantees an opposition with at least 25% of the seats; it rewards parties which are strong nationally rather than regionally, etc. In the recent Rodrigues Regional Assembly election, ?Block+1? would have returned the same outcome as the mixed PR system, which was utilized, namely 10 OPR and 8 MR seats.

The table below contrasting what would have been the outcomes under mixed PR (with 20 or 30 additional Party List seats) and ?Block+1? in past general elections further demonstrate that ?Block+1? is a most worthy option for reducing the deviation between votes and seats. Indeed, this local ?ti-raita? remedy can be as effective as foreign remedies.

Associate Professor Singfat CHU

Singapore