<B>Party list?best losers, single? multiple?double candidacies</B>

It should not be difficult to resolve these two differences. For many reasons the Party List is superior to best loser which does not exist anywhere. On the other hand,double candidacies are the norm in mixed party system as it gives freedom to parties to articulate their electoral strategies.The compromise is to have a party list that also includes unsuccessful constituency candidates.The choice must be left to parties to determine how many constituency contestants should be on the party list.They should take both the risks and the rewards of double candidacies.

<B>This is in fact recommended by Sachs: </B>

?There was considerable support for the idea that the party lists, as published in advance, could provide place for a certain number of constituency candidates who might end up not having been elected.?

It also exists in most,if not all,countries with mixed system.The party list may include constituency candidates; however their names should be published in advance to avoid all the problems of good losers as stated earlier on. This is a good compromise between Party List that excludes double candidacies ( Model C) and a good loser system that returns only losers.

<B>How many PR seats ?</B>

The number of PR seats has become a source of inexplicable confusion. Sachs recommended 30 PR seats in order to have enough seats to correct the anomalies of FPTP. Govt approved that recommendation. It went further by appointing a Select Committee with a clear mandate to introduce 30 PR seats. Both Model C and Model A propose 30 seats. As shown in previous papers,fewer than 30 PR seats would be largely inadequate to cure the ailments of FPTP. It would be ?panadol to cure cancer? as Dr Chu puts it. Allocating 30 seats by a parallel mode does not change much in terms of unfairness. Only 20 parallel PR seats would be sheer token.

<B>Fewer MPs while keeping balance between stability and fairness</B>

It is feasible to have a figure that is lower than 100 while preserving the balance between stability and fairness.If the 8 best loser seats are subsumed in 27 PR seats attributed through a compensatory mode, it is possible to have a Parliament of 89 MPs that is as representative as one with 100.There will be 62 FPTP seats and 27 PR ones. However it is imperative to have a rank based Party List published in advance to guarantee rainbow fairness.

<B>Facing the ?public perception? that 100 MPs are too many </B>

Some believe that 100 MPs are too many for Mauritius. In terms of expenses involved (more psychological than anything else as the financial impact is quite marginal) and because of the small population base.The terms of reference of both Sachs and the Select Committee stated clearly that both the 62 FPTP and the 8 best loser seats should remain. Under these circumtances, the only way to introduce a dose of PR to correct the huge inequality of FPTP is the addition of 30 PR seats to reach a total of 100.

I did raise this ?public perception problem? of 100 seats with the Sachs Commission. It is possible to keep the current 70 seats while introducing a dose of PR. It requires some political will.

One solution would be as follows:

(1) redefine electoral boundaries to create 16 constituencies of broadly equal size with a deviation of 10 % to 15 %;

(2) provide for 8 constituencies in urban and 8 in rural areas;

(3) return 3 FPTP members per constituency ;

(4) maintain 2 members for Rodrigues;

(5) introduce 20 PR seats on a compensatory basis with a 10 % eligibility threshold ;

(6) subsume best loser seats into the 20 PR seats;

(7) choose 20 PR MPs from rank-based party list published before polling to ensure broad based representation;

(8) allow for double candidacies.

This would give 70 MPs as today, 50 FPTP members and 20 PR MPs. It has many advantages.There is no additional expense for 30 MPs. It cures the problem of malapportionment as the ratio of voters to MPs would be broadly similar. It retains FPTP as the main basis of selecting MPs with 71 % of MPs returned through that mode and 29 % of PR Mps.The huge disproportionality of FPTP will be corrected with the 20 PR seats alloted on a compensatory basis. It is tilted towards stability while containing a good measure of fairness. By subsuming the 8 Best Loser seats in the List PR one can ?further its underlying affirmative objectives without perpetuating its anachronistic and divisive aspects?.

Party leaders will have the responsibility to ensure a balanced slate in constituencies and a broad based representation in terms of the composition and rank of the Party List.Those who don?t will be judged by the electorate at the polls. As 48 represents 80 % of 60, it is possible to adjust ?the entire rainbow? by 20 % to reach a balanced solution; in addition a well thought out Party List can provide additional security for broad based representation. In the overwhelming majority of cases we would have a very representative Parliament in terms of parties and the different colours of the rainbow.

<B>Gender fairness</B>

This is a hard nut to crack. It is always possible to reach an agreement if people differ on quota level (between 20 % and 30 %). However there is fundamental divergence on the concept itself. It is not helpful to clamour for gender fairness if one rejects quota.There is no other way to cure the women?s underrepresentation.Voluntary solution has not yielded any result as evidenced by low women?s presence in countries without quota.

One can only hope that the robust arguments of some experts could convince reluctant political actors of the absolute necessity to have gender fairness in a democracy. Then the stakeholders can work out a plan to reach an agreed share of female representative over some time. In the meantime, political parties which believe in gender fairness should include a quota for women in their internal rules. In certain countries some parties have quotas while others don?t. It is expected that considerable voting advantage will flow to parties which field large number of women candidates, thus forcing others to follow the lead.

<B>The 50 % + 1 artificial majority and a two-round formula</B>

A party with 30 % of vote cannot govern alone against 70 % of the electorate through constitutional engineering. It is a time bomb that will explode with dire consequences. In a two-way contest, the party that wins the FPTP mode will also be the overall winner after the attribution of PR seats. However in a three or four-battle, there is no such guarantee if the first party has too low a percentage of vote. It should get a majority with 42 % to 45 % in a three-horse fight. Below 40 %, there is no guarantee.The solution is either a pre-election alliance or a post-election coalition. Party leaders must assume their responsibilities.The reward of governing alone should be weighed against the risk of losing power !.One cannot have it both ways.

There is one solution which is adopted in some countries that require a majority to govern.The problem arises because no party captures close to 50 % of votes as there are more than two parties contesting elections. If we provide for FPTP MPs to be elected with a majority, as opposed to a plurality of vote, there would be no problem. In constituencies where no party captures 50 % of the vote, there would be a second round of elections between the first and the second parties, as is the case in France. A solution must then be found to allot some seats to parties which have polled 10 % of votes in the first round and are not eligible to participate in the second poll. This formula guarantees a 50 % majority. Of course,there are some risks.The party that is ahead in the first round is not guaranteed to win in the second. It depends on the transfer of votes between the two rounds. Its great merit is to resolve the ?minority transformed into artificial majority? nightmare.

<B>Some consequential changes </B>

There is need to make some changes in order to keep the consistency and integrity of the new electoral system.The aim of a 10 % threshold is to prevent communal parties from having legitimacy to distil their venom. However there is a loophole where they can come in through the backdoor of the best loser system. It occurred in 1995. It will be easier to campaign vigorously on single issues and win a best loser seat than to pass the very high 10 % PR threshold.Therefore a national threshold is necessary to be eligible for best loser seats. The same community will win the seats but the member will come from a mainstream party. In 1995 Soodhun of the MSM would have replaced Beeharry. In the midst of the fierce debate for the electoral system before Independence, passion and emotion ran so high that the protagonists overlooked this recommendation which was made by experts.They threw the baby with the bathwater.

Likewise, there should be a change to the amendment made in 1992 that allows members not belonging to ?the appropriate community? to become Best Losers as long as they are from the appropriate party and there are no members of the ?appropriate community? to appoint. This was the case in 2000. The appointment of such members defeats the very purpose of the best loser itself as it increases the underrepresentation that it has just corrected! A simple computation will show that the level of underrepresentation of some communities increased with the appointment of members not from the ?appropriate community?. With a Party List of 30, there would surely be members of the ?appropriate community? and the ?appropriate party? who can qualify for such best loser seats instead of alloting them to candidates not belonging to the ?appropriate community?.

Some changes are also required in the BLS to remove its discriminatory aspects,to curb its arbitrariness, to do away with its anachronism, to cure some of its defects, to minimise its irrationality, and to eliminate some of its paradoxes.

<B>What should be avoided to have good reform</B>

Proposals for reforms often suffer from three main drawbacks. First, parties often favour the status quo from which they have benefitted and/or are likely to benefit. They could also introduce changes either to increase their chances of success or to prevent their opponents from winning. Second, political actors, however well-intentioned, may not always have all the knowledge and the information to fully grasp all the consequences and ramifications of different electoral systems. Third, electoral reforms are rarely made in a political vacuum. It depends on contextual and temporal factors.

It is all too often about realpolitik and party partisanship. A good reform should avoid these pitfalls. Some politicians are often tempted to design electoral systems which they think will give them a partisan advantage. This could lead to choices that are not the best ones for the long term political development of the country with potentially far reaching consequences for the democratic process. The worst that could happen is an attempt to satisfy the short term objectives of some political parties.

As the choice of a particular electoral system has far reaching consequences on the future political life of the country and as, once chosen, it often stays in force for a very long period, we cannot afford a half baked or a partisan solution. There is need to be alert to the unintended consequences of reforms as, if conducted for short term partisan benefit, a country may have worse than it bargained for.

It is of utmost importance for the stability and the progress of the country that we build consensus, seek legitimacy and secure wide acceptance for a change in the electoral formula. The new system should also be robust and sustainable. It is equally imperative, in the exercise, to acknowledge the disdavantages of alternative systems in addition to their presumed virtues. And we must assess whether it is possible to avoid the drawbacks of the current system without introducing undesirable features and consequences in the new formula.

<B>Moving the process forward</B>

Everybody agrees that the current system is unfair and should be overhauled.There is consensus on keeping the FPTP mode as the main mode of returning MPs. Equally most want the proposed formula to discourage communal parties. As expected there are differences in reform proposals of the various stakeholders. In some countries, the divergences were greater. However, compromises were made to reach an acceptable reform. A round table comprising all stakeholders should be organized and some electoral specialists should help the participants to make an informed choice. One can only hope that reason, informed judgement and long term national interest will prevail.

<I>As the choice of a particular electoral system has far reaching consequences on the future political life of the country and as,once chosen,it often stays in force for a very long period,we cannot afford a half baked or a partisan solution.</I>