Vijay MAKHAN MMM spokesperson for Foreign Affairs

On 27th September 2002, much amidst understandable anxiety and apprehension on the part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), negotiations on an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) were launched in Brussels with the European Union (EU). The mood of the ACP, especially among the African states, as they embarked on this uncharted journey, was one characterised by the fear of the unknown. Suddenly these states found the very foundations on which, for almost four decades, they had built ?privileged and preferential? relations with the EU shaking to near collapsing point.

Right from the word ?go?, the negotiations were terribly skewed against the ACP. The latter, true to its way of doing things, had not given time and thought to alternative arrangements that could be envisaged between the two grossly unequal groups in replacement of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, whose demise had already been programmed on the altar of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The ACP, as far as one can remember, has always reacted to proposals put forth by its ?partner?. It has seldom, if ever, initiated action for consideration by the other side. The EPA proposal was yet another discovery of the Commission of the EU.

The ACP, this time again, had no alternative but to follow the EU along the path desired and decided by the latter. But the worse was yet to come. The EU has known all along that unity and solidarity were vain words as far as the ACP was concerned and that it would not be too difficult to have them sit as broken components at the negotiating table. Even the ?A? of the ACP was further sub-divided into four distinct negotiating groups, aligned as it were on the so-called existing Regional Economic Communities, to wit West Africa (ECOWAS), Central Africa (CEEAC), Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern Africa (SADC). Of course, the ACP itself is largely responsible for this divisive nature of the negotiating configurations. The African group in Brussels, principally some members of the Western and Central African groups, had allowed themselves to be convinced that they could go separately and that indeed, negotiating as separate entities would be advantageous to them. (In my capacity as the then Commissioner of the African Union (AU) responsible for economic matters, I tried in vain to reason the African Group of Ambassadors in Brussels on the dire necessity for the African countries to put up a common stance and negotiate as one Group, as opposed to four sub-regional groups. Much to my chagrin, they were adamant in maintaining separate groups, even though the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU had decreed that the African Group should negotiate as one entity!). It should be recalled that the main objective of the AU which had just been launched, was the acceleration of the integration process of the continent. Today, it has dawned on the African actors around the negotiating table that the format adopted for that exercise runs contrary to that objective and indeed undermines the principle of integration. Yet, it was made abundantly clear that in these negotiations, no sub-region would be treated more advantageously to the detriment of another!

So, for five years the so-called negotiations have gone on. There is little to show in terms of progress. Suddenly now, pressure is mounting and being brought to bear on the ACP regions, and in certain cases, at the highest level, to conclude these negotiations before the deadline of 31st December, 2007. With a clear absence of commonality of purpose, lack of coordination at all levels and procrastination to boot, one should not wonder why the African countries, signatory of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, find themselves in such a tight corner. Add to that, the fact that the majority of the African states, negotiating in whichever configuration, fall in the category of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The EU has already offered unrestricted market access to this category of countries under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative put forward by Pascal Lamy at the time he was Commissioner at the European Union Commission.

The incentive for these countries to negotiate at all and sign an EPA with the Union is rather insignificant. Take the case of the negotiating configuration to which we, Mauritius, belong, that is, Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). Twelve out of the sixteen countries in that group are LDCs. Obviously, their interest in concluding an EPA with the EU would be far from being common with the non-LDC states. We are almost in October. What is it that we can achieve in three months that we have not been able to do in five years of ?negotiations?? Our ?privileged partner? through the mouth of Peter Mandelson, the EU Commissioner in charge of trade, appears to leave no room for manoeuvre to the ACP. The latter has been pushed to the brink or against the wall! Either way the situation is non too exciting! Mr Mandelson says that : ?This deadline is not a bluff or some negotiating tactic invented in Brussels. It is an external reality created in the WTO in Geneva. We have given a binding multilateral commitment that was set and agreed seven years ago.? It is a question of the livelihood, the wellbeing of millions of people, a vast majority of whom live below the poverty line (less than a dollar a day)! It is a question of millions of people for whom the international community (foremost in that league the EU) has set Millennium Development Goals, one of which is the halving of poverty by 2015! How does one reconcile this very lofty objective with Mr Mandelson?s threat when he says : ?he has no hat and no rabbit to pull out of it?! So do or die, is it?

Detrimental decisions concerning the ACP

When the negotiations were launched, there were two aspects to them: trade and development. Hardly any negotiation of consequence has been undertaken covering the development dimension! And yet, not much is being said about this seeming disinterest or is it disagreement in the concept? On the other hand, right from day one, it was made clear that whatever conclusions would be reached in the EPA talks would have to be WTO compatible. Hence, already the room for manoeuvre was very tight. (When in my capacity as Commissioner of the AU, I met with my counterpart of the EU, Mr. Pascal Lamy over the same negotiations, he told me in no uncertain terms that he didn?t really see anything to negotiate on trade as the real negotiations were taking place at the WTO and that in any case, whatever we conclude in that respect would imperatively have to be compatible with the WTO rules. It would be best, he said, that we concentrate more on the development issues!). Five long years have elapsed. Not much water has flowed under this particular bridge. Many studies have been carried out by such reputable organisations and institutions as Oxfam and European Centre for Development Policy Management, among others. All have concluded that EPAs were not the best way forward for the ACP. Civil society organisations and other non-governmental organisations (European and African alike) have voiced their disagreement with the EPAs, and even the European Parliament has appealed to the Commission of the EU to ensure that ACP countries are not forced to sign Agreements that would be detrimental to them.

Our ?privileged partner? through the mouth of Peter Mandelson, the EU Commissioner in charge of trade, appears to leave no room for manoeuvre to the ACP.

?Stop the EPAs? campaign

A study by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa concluded that the African countries would not be ready to sign such agreements by the set deadline. All to no avail. Yet, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement provides for EPAs or other alternative arrangements which would not leave the ACP countries worse off than under the present trading regime! Besides our limited capacity to negotiate advantageously and failure to field the same negotiators in a consistent manner, (the same ones have to cover other ongoing negotiations including at the WTO) let us also recall that our countries have hardly involved the people in these negotiations. The consequence thereof is that on the 27th of September, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the launching of the EPA negotiations in Brussels, Civil society organisations and a number of interested non-governmental organisations have in turn launched a ?Stop the EPAs? campaign!

No agreement is better than a bad agreement! The way forward at this point in time can only be political. The ACP should convene in extraordinary session at the highest level and decide not to sign, to start with. They should then do one of the following two things: (1) together with the EU negotiate for an extension of the waiver at the WTO for a minimum period of one year. During that period both parties should explore seriously alternative arrangements for a trade relationship, it being understood that the EU would not place on the negotiating table issues which the ACP countries under the umbrella of the G90 have collectively and unanimously rejected at the WTO. Or, (2) again with the EU and the help of other developing countries, address the imbalances that exist in the WTO rules and change them to make them more developing country-friendly. The EU would probably reject both options, especially the second one.

Taking the first option is a viable political option and they can do it. It is all a question of political will and genuine partnership.

There may be a third way. The EU should move now to have the ACP countries placed on the list of countries eligible for an enhanced Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), also known as GSP+, again for a period of one year as from 1st January 2008. There are presently some fifteen developing countries that benefit from the GSP+ regime which provides preferential market access that is substantially higher than GSP for countries implementing certain international standards in human and labour rights, environmental protection, the fight against illicit drugs and good governance.

Political solution

To qualify for the GSP+ scheme, developing countries have to meet two criteria: economic and governance. A study carried out in 2005 (Stevens and Kennan) concludes that all ACP countries meet the economic criterion of ?vulnerability?. On the governance criterion, according to the 2006 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, the ACP countries have ratified almost all international conventions. In the case of Mauritius, according to the same UNDP report, three conventions need to be either signed and ratified or ratified where signature has already taken place. These are : The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (signed but not ratified), The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. According to a study co-authored by Emily Jones of Oxfam and Tetteh Hormeku of TWN Africa, under a GSP+ scheme, the value of trade from Mauritius that would receive duty-free access based on 2005 exports ? excluding sugar ? would be 99.92%, the same as under the present Cotonou regime.

Shifting or breaking configuration at this eleventh hour is an option that Mauritius would do well to avoid. If anything, Mauritius should go the political way and with other like-minded countries push for an all ACP Summit to address this matter politically. Mauritius should also demand that this issue be put on the Africa-Europe Summit agenda slated for early December in Lisbon and again push for a political solution? including the possibility of having the Cotonou regime extended as a transitional arrangement pending agreement on alternative trading arrangements.