Professor Chu criticises the proposal for a mixed electoral system comprising the current 62 first past the post elected representatives and 30 Members of Parliament (MPs) chosen on the basis of a corrective PR system. Instead, he recommends either a ?straight party list PR at the national level? or a ?Vote X, elect X+1? MPs in all constituencies.

I believe there is consensus in the country to maintain the current first-past-the-post (FPTP) system of returning 62 MPs in 21 constituencies. There is also broad agreement to introduce a measure of PR so as to cure the major weaknesses of the ?winner takes all? formula in terms of political exclusion, lack of equitable representation of parties, gender unfairness and the huge disparity between votes cast and seat obtained. However, divergences remain on which mixed system to embrace. The debate hinges on which dose of PR to inject in the existing system, how to introduce it and how to handle some of the related issues such as the method of returning MPs for the PR component of the mixed system.

It has already been decided that the current 62 MPs and the 8 Best Losers will be maintained. According to the terms of reference of the Select Committee, there would, in addition, be 30 MPs chosen on a PR basis from parties that have polled more than 10% of the national vote. Reopening the debate on whether we should discard the current system and replace it by a ?straight party list PR at the national level? does not help at all. Neither the Sachs Commission nor the Select Committee had or has the mandate to propose a pure PR system. Not even the Government for that matter.

However, the second proposal of Professor Chu requires consideration, even if it has already been examined and rejected by the Sachs Commission (Model E). It advocates the adoption of an additional 20 PR seats by returning to Parliament the fourth candidate in each of the 20 FPTP constituencies, through a limited vote system where electors have fewer votes than there are seats to return (here three votes to choose four MPs). It would give a Parliament of 90 MPs, inclusive of the 8 Best Losers. It is a very old form of semi-PR which purports to alleviate the fear of one party dominating the political system without giving representation to others. It is a very crude way of ensuring representation of parties and was used in Spain and Portugal in the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century and in some parts of the UK in the 19th. Because of its crudeness and randomness, its high risks of manipulation and above all as modern versions of mixed systems are much superior in achieving broad representation, it is not in use anywhere to return MPs.

Strictly speaking, the proposal also falls outside the ambit of the Select Committee which clearly mentions 30 PR seats. However, it is possible to satisfy the requirement of the terms of reference of the Select Committee by appointing 10 more unsuccessful candidates in addition to the 20 contestants that come fourth in the 20 constituencies to give a total of 30 PR MPs.

Its alleged merit is its simplicity. But it is highly dangerously especially in a plural and diverse society as Mauritius. It will lead to bitter infighting among running mates as most of the time only one of the three candidates of the unsuccessful party will be returned.

It will openly encourage communal and sub communal votes for the choice of the fourth MP. Candidates from the same party will use all sorts of shenanigans to ensure that they are ahead of their colleagues. It could produce huge problems of socio-ethnic under-representation. Anybody familiar with the Mauritian system, the way candidates are aligned in constituencies and the pattern of votes, will fully understand the implications of this point.

Because of its crudeness and its randomness, it could also lead to a serious perversion as winners could become losers overall. A simple example will drive home this point. Assume three parties, A, B and C are contesting the elections. In the current system if Party A captures all three seats in 11 constituencies, it is assured of winning the overall election, irrespective of what happens in the other 9 districts (33 seats against 27 out of a total of 60 MPs). In a three vote/four MPs system, this cannot be guaranteed. Assume that Party A wins the first three seats in 11 constituencies (33 seats) while Party B captures the first three in the other nine ridings (27 seats). Party A does not obtain any fourth seat while Party B garners 11 such seats (the remaining nine goes to Party C). Party B becomes the first formation with 38 seats out of which 27 only are ?true winners? while Party A ends up as a loser even if it has 33 ?true winners?. Under our current system Party A would be the clear winner with 33 seats and Party B would be unsuccessful with 27 MPs. A winner becomes a loser because of the crudeness and randomness of a perverse electoral system. There could also be a hung Parliament where parties B and C could coalesce to deny victory to Party A even if the latter has bagged a relatively large majority of ?true winners?. As a matter of fact even with 39 ?true winners? out of 60, a party is not guaranteed to win the elections as the system could give the other contestants a total of 41 seats. Winners are hence transformed into losers. This is simply absurd and will never be accepted by the population.

It may also go against the wish of the electorate. It is unfair for a party that polls 40% of the votes to have no seats; it is equally unjust for a formation that has only 50% of the votes to capture 90% of seats. However, in curing these two defects we should not create a serious anomaly that will undermine the very foundation of free and democratic elections. If in fact people cast their vote in such a way that it gives over 75% of the votes to a coalition, why should the electoral formula deny it over 75% of the seats? Two wrongs do not make a right. With 100 seats, the three votes/ four or five seats formula limits the maximum seats to 60% ( 60 MPs out of a total of 100). Equally, in some constituencies, some may become MPs with merely 10% of the votes as long as they are fourth (in non marginal constituencies) while in others, candidates may not be returned with 45% of the votes (in marginal ridings).This is plainly absurd. What is required is a formula that captures the will of the people without introducing unacceptable perversions. It is votes obtained by parties at the national level that should count!

Need to avoid a dangerous move

I have met some well-intentioned politicians who believe that it is better to choose PR MPs among unsuccessful constituency candidates. As opposed to a pre-determined rank based party list which exists in most, if not, all countries with mixed system. The good loser idea has support particularly among some members of political parties who fear their heavyweight colleagues will take the electable positions on the party list. Professor Chu seems to support that stand when he asks ?why should constituency candidates sweat and toil while party list candidates rest far from the fray?.

This has been rejected by the Sachs commission as it is a poisoned chalice. While seeming attractive and fair, it is fraught with difficulties and will lead to serious anomalies. This is the reason why it is not in use. I do not know of any country with a mixed system that returns PR MPs on the basis of unsuccessful constituency candidates. The reasons should be obvious and the more so in a plural and diverse society as Mauritius.

Firstly, party leaders that represent the soul of the party may not be returned by a Good Loser system because of the constituency where they stand. Secondly, some candidates that have assumed very high responsibilities and have taken difficult, albeit unpopular decisions, in the best interest of the country may be disadvantaged as newcomers could take the fourth place. Thirdly, in a two cornered fight, the formula will produce an outcome where 98 candidates out of the 120 will be in Parliament. This may cause some problem of legitimacy as all the 30 PR MPs would be losers. A list system with some PR MPs from the constituencies and some from a pre-determined slate is significantly better and more acceptable. Basically, it is what has been proposed by the Sachs Commission after considerable examination. Fourth, it would lead to infighting among the three ?losing? running mates as they compete among each other to qualify for a good loser seat. Fifth a Good Loser mode will not promote gender fairness as women would be disadvantaged. Sixth, it will prevent parties from appointing some good candidates from the civil society who do not want to endure the trials and tribulations of day-to-day constituency politics but could make a significant contribution in the running of the country. Placing some of these people on a pre-determined list would cast the net wide, thus enhancing the chances of having core competencies to manage the daunting challenges facing the country. This is basically how it happens in many mature countries and we have to catch up. They will have legitimacy as they have come in as a result of the votes polled by their parties nationally. The list should be published before the polls so that voters know who they are. In effect, they are elected nationally instead of being returned from a particular constituency. Seventh, to ensure a broad based rainbow representation, it is much better to have a pre-determined list than to gamble on the randomness of the Good Loser system. This should be so clear to anybody who knows how candidates are fielded and how the voting pattern could bias the choice of Good Losers. As well articulated by the Sachs Commission, we run the high risks of ?encouraging an increase in communal tensions (?) with an unacceptable potential for destabilisation of national harmony?. Eighth, the adoption of a Good Loser system to return PR MPs will cause great prejudice to candidates who contest elections in very large constituencies. Mauritius has a major problem of mal-apportionment. There is probably no country in the world that allows such huge variation in the number of electors among constituencies. In the USA, it cannot exceed 1%. In Mauritius, it is currently at 127% (the largest constituency has 50,000 electors and the smallest one has 22,000). Democracy is not only about ?one man, one vote? but also about ?one vote, one count?. It is abundantly clear that many people are being disenfranchised by such huge disparity in the electoral boundaries. The adoption of a Good Loser system to return PR MPs based on the highest percentage of votes for unsuccessful candidates will further penalise these large constituencies. A candidate with few votes in a small constituency will have a huge advantage compared to a contestant from a large constituency with many more votes. In 1995, Imam Beeharry won a seat with only 4,405 votes while Soodhun did not get one with 7,416 votes (68% more ). In 2000, Leopold with only 7,732 votes won a seat while Petit with 14,626 (97% more) did not. It would lead to a situation where the 6th candidate (or 7th for that matter) from a small constituency would have a much better chance of being chosen as a Good Loser PR MP than a fourth person from a large one. This is both unfair and unacceptable. Ninth, the argument that party elites (or their leaders for that matter) would have too much power in the determination of the PR list is at best tenuous and at worst an utter denial of our political reality. The overwhelming majority of people vote for the parties and their leaders. Often elections become sheer Prime Ministerial contests. Since the introduction of the current electoral system, there has never been an elected independent MP. If party elites do not want a particular individual to stand as a candidate, he has no chance of being elected. The parties or their leaders choose who are candidates and where they stand. They also appoint Ministers, usually among senior members of the party. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand the criticisms of those who argue that party elites would have too much power in choosing a pre-determined rank based PR list. Qui peut plus peut moins ! The relative merits of such a formula are far superior in comparison to the drawbacks of alternative systems.

Critical issues to consider

On the assumption that we are moving in the direction of 62 FPTP MPs, 8 Best Losers and 30 PR seats with a 10% threshold, there are many issues that need to be resolved. In some cases, specific recommendations have already been made by the Sachs Commission and in all likelihood others would be forthcoming from the Select Committee. The key areas where there will be debate and discussion are the following:

i) whether the 30 PR seats would be on a compensatory, on a parallel or on a wasted vote basis. This would determine the fairness of the system and the significance of the reduction in disproportion between votes and seats;

ii) whether the two votes (FPTP and PR) would have the same weight or there would be restriction on the importance of the PR vote;

iii) how PR MPs would be returned;

iii) whether there would be double candidacies and how many;

iv) whether there would be guidelines issued for the composition of the PR list to ensure gender fairness (both in terms of number and rank), plurality and diversity or these would be left to parties;

v) when the PR list has to be published;

vi) whether there would be one set or two sets of votes (three for each constituency and one for the National list);

vii) the structure of the ballot to reflect the PR vote;

viii) how to adjust the percentage of votes won by eligible parties (after eliminating those who have obtained less that the 10% threshold) before allotting the 30 PR seats;

ix) whether the mathematical formula to allocate these seats would be the highest average or the largest remainder;

x) whether there would be specific provisions for replacement of a PR MP;

xi) whether there would be restrictions on PR MPs crossing the floor;

xii) the sequence in the allotment of PR and

Best Loser seats and the consequences of one on the other.

Rama Sithanen Leading economic spokesman for the Labour party