by Anand MOHEEPUTH

Those who used to see Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam from a distance were struck with his good qualities, with his friendliness and good nature, with his intelligence and more so with his good intentions and moderation. Here was what Mauritians would normally look upon as a ?sympathetic? man. That trait was an important source of power for Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and so effectively he wielded that power that he was able to weather political storms and reaped handsome dividends. One could oppose Ramgoolam?s style of politics but he was generally regarded as a gentleman. Sir Gaëtan Duval who fought him at some time or other and worked closely with him revealed in a write up that in the management of politics and in order to keep a grip on power, Sir Seewoosagur was a ruthless. He remained at the helm with his on and off romance with the PMSD as much with the skill with which he navigated the shoals of coalition politics.

In fact, it was in the management of politics that Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam showed his ruthlessness, that he was made of a sterner stuff and that as a political operator, endowed with manipulative skills, he could set the opposition house ablaze and watched the fireworks. Thus, the PMSD which emerged as a force to reckon with in the 1960s found itself ripped apart shortly after the 1967 election. Ramgoolam wanted the PMSD to join the government. Gaëtan Duval persistently kept turning down Ramgoolam?s offer but when Yvon St Guillaume defied his party?s discipline by attending the independence day ceremony, that was the first signal of the Ramgoolam?s blast launched on the PMSD. Ramgoolam warned Duval to put an end to his stubbornness if he was not to end up sitting on top of a smoking ruin. Leave alone St Guillaume, the leader of the PMSD himself succumbed to the charm of Ramgoolam. Since then, the PMSD was a house on fire with some of its members jumping the fence to seek shelter under the Labour umbrella. Those who were still adopting the hard line in resisting Ramgoolam and Duval hoped to keep going by shifting on to a rickety UDM.

This was what Ramgoolam was capable of: engineering splits and promoting a defection culture or at the most running a coalition government. His move in roping the PMSD in the government could also have been triggered by two factors: first, Ramgoolam felt ill at ease when rattled by criticism, so, he thought it wise to get the opposition in the government and share the responsibilities for the net result. As in the case of the PMSD, though it was credited with bringing tangible results in some sectors, some of the unpalatable decisions of the government were merely put to the account of Duval as it was much easier to do because of his flamboyant playboy image and happy-go-lucky manner. For example, the suppression of the 1972 election, to keep off the challenge of the rising MMM, was believed to be the handiwork of Duval when in reality that was not so.

Second, the white plantocracy which ?owned? the PMSD was bitterly averse to Ramgoolam assuming control of the government that in its display of hostility to Ramgoolam, it had come to resemble not so much an economic power house as an official political party. In the role of power broker, it decided to cobble a PMSD-IFB alliance with the post of Prime Minister offered to Sookdeo Bissoondoyal. This is revealed by Sir Gaëtan Duval himself in an interview to

Le Mauricien in 1986. Even Gaëtan Duval whose charisma propelled the PMSD to a decent 44% score at the election of 1967 was marked as the sacrificial lamb on the altar of the oligarchy in order to halt at whatever cost Ramgoolam going through. But Bissoondoyal showed that he was no opportunist and as a honest politician turned the offer down. By reducing the PMSD to smithereens, Ramgoolam killed two birds with one stone. The private sector lost all hope in promoting a political party. It was left with no option but to come to terms with the government.

Ramgoolam?s stratagem, as Gaëtan Duval pointed out, in creating splits and defections was based on one element: luring gullible members of the opposing camp with nominations they would never have dreamt of in their life. He had a profound grasp of human behaviour and weaknesses that he went about exploiting these to his advantage. The defection culture was milked thoroughly. It was also a way for Ramgoolam to consolidate his power, discouraging rebellion and taming down anyone who dared challenge his authority. It is said that between 1968 and 1976, as many as twenty-eight of the seventy members of the Legislative Assembly became turncoats, shifting allegiance to one party or another, most of them enjoying the patronage of Ramgoolam. They were baited out by the post of ministers, junior ministers or parliamentary secretaries.

But the PMSD and the IFB were not the only ones to suffer from the defection culture . The MMM despite being impregnated with a new breed of politicians in the 70s had likewise to grapple with that sort of ?cross border? situation. As an example, reference is made to an episode after the general election of 1976 as recounted by Navin Ramgoolam in an interview to l?express in 2000. Having received intelligence that one of the leaders of the Labour party was about to jump to the MMM?s side and that was to change the political configuration if it did happen, Sir Seewoosagur rushed home from a reception, insisting the member be called as he wanted to give him a swift kick in the ass. When he came, Ramgoolam told him that he had no problem if he had made up his mind to go to the other side but that he (SSR) could as well foil the MMM?s plan by inducing a few of the MMMs to cross the floor to his side. A talented Ramgoolam showed off his little stunt the next day. The MMM lost a member who was readily offered a ministerial chair.

Making or breaking alliances, encouraging defections were all part of Ramgoolam?s modus operandi. That was his style of politics and life without politics did not mean anything to him. He never carried the baggage of an ideologue on his head. He knew ideologues have no place in the Mauritian political firmament. He was thus able to change and adjust according to changing circumstances. This sign of giving free vent to his mind had manifested itself early in his political career in the 1940s. As such, when he realized that it was time to abandon his friends of L?Union Mauricienne, he did so. Raoul Rivet upset by Ramgoolam?s change of attitude and re-orientation wrote in Le Mauricien that Ramgoolam was capable of ?swings and changes of mind? and his true intention was hard to read. The Governor, Sir Donald Mackenzie-Kennedy, put it another way when he wrote way back in 1945 to the Colonial office that Ramgoolam was a ?dangerous? man. Revered as a gentleman, Ramgoolam was, however, determined and ruthless in politics.